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Abstract
Background: Checklists are common in some medical fields, including surgery, intensive care and emergency
medicine. They can be an effective tool to improve care processes and reduce mortality and morbidity. Despite the
seemingly rapid acceptance and dissemination of the checklist, there are few studies describing the actual process
of developing and implementing such tools in health care. The aim of this study is to explore the experiences
from checklist development and implementation in a group of non-medical, high reliability organisations (HROs).
Method: A qualitative study based on key informant interviews and field visits followed by a Delphi approach.
Eight informants, each with 10-30 years of checklist experience, were recruited from six different HROs.
Results: The interviews generated 84 assertions and recommendations for checklist implementation. To achieve
checklist acceptance and compliance, there must be a predefined need for which a checklist is considered a well
suited solution. The end-users ("sharp-end”) are the key stakeholders throughout the development and
implementation process. Proximity and ownership must be assured through a thorough and wise process. All
informants underlined the importance of short, self-developed, and operationally-suited checklists. Simulation is a
valuable and widely used method for training, revision, and validation.
Conclusion: Checklists have been a cornerstone of safety management in HROs for nearly a century, and are
becoming increasingly popular in medicine. Acceptance and compliance are crucial for checklist implementation in
health care. Experiences from HROs may provide valuable input to checklist implementation in healthcare.
Introduction
It has been said that while medicine used to be ineffi-
cient, simple, and safe it is now effective, highly com-
plex, and dangerous [1]. Adverse events are documented
to affect more than one in 25 hospital patients [2]. Fail-
ure to check equipment and lack of vigilance are exam-
ples of factors associated with adverse events [3,4].
Realising how prone we as humans are for short term
memory loss, it is striking how many potentially danger-
ous medical procedures are based on perfect memory
[5]. In this context, it is rather strange that checklists
are not used more often in medicine.
Checklists are common in some medical fields, and
can be an effective tool to improve care processes and
reduce mortality and morbidity [6-11]. Checklists are
also shown to be a useful tool in pre-hospital and emer-
gency medicine [12,13]. However, the development and
implementation of medical checklists share some of the
same challenges as other quality improvement work in
medicine, and can be a complex and resource-demand-
ing exercise. Despite the seemingly rapid acceptance and
dissemination of the WHO Safe Surgery Checklist, there
are few studies describing the actual process of develop-
ing and implementing such tools in health care [14,15].
High reliability organisations (HROs) are often
referred to in the medical literature because they per-
form hazardous and complex operations with an excep-
tionally low failure rate [16,17]. Examples of HRO are
aviation and aerospace industry, nuclear power produc-
tion, fire fighting, military operations, and engineering.
Checklists are commonly used in HROs as cognitive
aids, freeing mental capacity for the operation itself.
These organisations have decades of experience with
checklist development and implementation. HROs also
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have a deep understanding of both the demanding con-
ditions under which the “sharp-end” operates, and how
the “blunt-end” and “sharp-end” interact (table 1) [18].
Aviation has often been referred to among the non-
medical HROs. We believe that the extensive experience
gained in aviation and other HROs are a valuable and
under-utilized source for learning and improving health
care safety. The aim of this study was to explore ideas
and lessons learned from checklist development and
implementation in a group of non-medical HROs.
Methods
The study was approved by the local Institutional
Research Ethics Committee. A triangulation of methods
was chosen. In order to gain in-depth and cultural
understanding, a qualitative approach with key infor-
mant interviews and field visits were used [19]. The
results from the interviews were further analysed, by
health care workers, using a Delphi process.
Participants
To obtain a range of views, eight informants were
recruited from six different HROs based on the litera-
ture and the authors’ personal knowledge (table 2)
[20,21]. The organisations were formally asked to
appoint the informants. The candidates then under-
went a pilot interview to ensure that they had compre-
hensive experience in checklist development and
“sharp-end” use of checklists in addition to a compre-
hensive cultural understanding of their own organisa-
tion. All the informants were males, with 10-30 years
of experience in high-risk operations. As the organisa-
tions all had restrictions on sharing experiences or
standing operating procedures with the public, the
informants had to have an organisational standing giv-
ing them permission to disclose and discuss potentially
sensitive information.
Interviews and analysis
Six of the experts underwent a semi structured interview
at their work place and two by telephone. The interview
guide had broad, open-ended questions regarding the
informants’ personal experiences with checklists. The
interviews (lasting 45 to 90 minutes) were tape recorded
and transcribed verbatim. Furthermore, one of the
authors (OT) made field visits to all the HROs to
observe their checklist use and organisation. Field notes
were taken during parts of interviews when audio
recording was inconvenient or not permitted (e.g. during
a tour of the nuclear plant or inside the parachute pack-
ing area). All transcripts and field notes were reviewed
by two of the authors (OT & GB) who identified and
agreed on 8-12 assertions from each informant regard-
ing important issues and elements in checklist develop-
ment and implementation. These assertions were
returned to the informants for validation (member
check), resulting in minor revisions. The authors (except
AE), who all have previous experience with quality
improvement projects, further analysed the assertions in
a Delphi approach by e-mail and during a final consen-
sus meeting [22,23]. In the first step of the process, each
author proposed groups and subgroups of assertions. In
the second step, the most important assertions were
pinpointed. Finally, there was a consensus meeting
where the groups and subgroups where further dis-
cussed. The lead authors (OT & GB) then performed
the final analysis, and all authors agreed on the result.
Figure 1 illustrates the entire process.
Results
The key informant interviews generated 84 assertions
and recommendations for checklist development and
implementation (available from the corresponding
author). Seventeen assertions were judged not to be
transferrable to health care, and were excluded from
further analysis. The assertions were categorized into
five main groups with additional subgroups. Citations
are in italics and the individual source is identified with
capital letters.
Assumptions for checklist acceptance
Several of the informants underlined that a checklist is a
tool, not a goal in itself. In order to build a reliable
safety culture and achieve checklist acceptance, two
basic assumptions must be met; firstly, “There must be a
predefined problem that a checklist is the right tool for
solving” (C) and secondly, “The end user must not get
the feeling that he or she is deprived of the opportunity
to apply common sense” (A).
Stakeholders in checklist development
All of the informants expressed that proximity to the
checklist development process is very important. One
informant cautioned about merely copying checklists;
“There must be a built-in scepticism as to whether the
experiences of others are relevant for my organisation”
(B). Two informants said; “Proximity between the check-
list owner and the end user is important” (D) and
Table 1 Characteristics of HROs
Preoccupation with the possibility of failure
Resistance to oversimplification
Sensitivity to “sharp-end” operations
Commitment to resilience and self-preservation
Deference to shifting locations of expertise
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“Checklists should be made within the organisation that
intends to use it” (G).
Within an organisation, there are many relevant par-
ties. Table 3 lists some stakeholders involved in checklist
development and implementation.
Characteristics of the checklist itself
Length
All informants agreed that limiting the length of a check-
list is crucial for its feasibility and usefulness. One infor-
mant (E) referred to the resuscitation “ABC checklist”. He
believed that the reason that this checklist is well known
worldwide is because of its simplicity (e.g. it follows the
alphabet and is hierarchical, where A is more important
than B, and B is more important than C). Another infor-
mant warned about the gradual extension of an initially
short and well-adapted checklist; “Be careful not to extend
checklists because someone - often inexperienced personnel
- calls for a more comprehensive list. Too many additions
may result in a long and useless checklist” (B).
Lay-out and design
“Be extremely attentive to font and graphics” (E). The
informants had experiences with numerous design types.
“The design must be adapted to the surroundings, e.g.
noise, light conditions, and vibrations” (D). One infor-
mant recommended that a professional graphics
designer be used to produce the final version of the
checklist (G).
Table 2 Data on the key informants and their organisations
Type of HRO Organisation Key informant’s organisational rank &
positions
Personal experience with checklist use
(years)
Nuclear power Forsmark, Sweden Reactor operator & security manager 15
Safety engineer 25
Off-shore drilling Statoil ASA, Norway Safety manager 20
Safety coordinator 12
Civil aviation Norwegian Air Ambulance Service Captain and flight safety officer 30
Navy Submarine Training Centre, Norway Commanding officer 10
Military special
operations
Air Force Special Operation Unit,
Norway
Commanding officer 23
Military aviation National Search & Rescue Service,
Norway
Captain and deputy executive officer 11
Delphi
approach
Key
informant
interviews
8  interviews
with
informants
from HROs
Round 1
Categorisation of 
assertions into groups 
and subgroups
84 assertions 
regarding checklist 
development and
implementation
Round 2
Prioritisation
of assertions
Consensus
meeting
Figure 1 Flow of the analysis of key informant interviews and
application of the Delphi process.
Table 3 Stakeholders in the checklist development and
implementation process.
The “sharp-end”
user
“The end-user must be involved in the development
process” (F)
“The leader of the development process must be one
of the ‘sharp-end’ users” (D)
Head of
department
“The checklist must be developed by the users, but
quality assured by the responsible head of the
department” (G)
Indirectly affected
parties
“If an operation for which a checklist is planned to be
developed affects a third party, the third party must
also be informed and consulted” (H)
Well-recognised
or
leading person
“Get an authority, a leading person, or someone with
a good reputation to represent the checklist
implementation” (H)
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Content
According to the informants, none of the HROs used any
specific validated methods for selecting the specific con-
tent of checklists, but some important issues from this
process were mentioned. One informant (B) described
the “20/80 rule” (the Pareto-principle). His organisation
believed that 20% of the possible adverse events would
cause 80% of the consequences. Hence, this principle was
used to identify and prioritize the content of their check-
lists. Several informants emphasized the importance of a
precise and operationally-suited checklist. “The checklist
must describe exactly the intended operation” (A) and
“The checklist, and its content, must directly reflect the
specific operation and its surroundings” (E).
Human factors during checklist utilisation
“The checklist must foster resilient communication” (G).
The informants underlined the importance of under-
standing and communication to minimize the risk of
misunderstandings and to optimize flow during checklist
use (Table 4).
Revisions and validation
All the informants described a thorough system for
checklist revisions. One informant (E) said that revisions
are important for two reasons; firstly, “To maintain a
dynamic and up-to-date checklist” and secondly, “To
build a culture where the sharp-end feels that their feed-
back is valuable to the organization”. All informants
used the terms “revision” and “validation” imprecisely
and interchangeably. The key “validation” measure
described by the informants was the absence of serious
accidents and adverse events after introducing the
checklists. Table 5 lists the different methods and
approaches for validation and revision.
Discussion
Experiences with checklists in health care are limited com-
pared with HROs. Few studies have explored these organi-
sations’ acquired knowledge in checklist development and
implementation. Our findings suggest several issues worth
considering when introducing medical checklists.
Translating ideas from HROs to patient safety
HROs undoubtedly have thorough and trustworthy
experience with checklists, but some have questioned
whether health care has gone too far in translating ideas
from HROs in general [24]. HROs and medicine have
many similarities concerning human factors and com-
plex operations. They both fall prey to the limitations of
human pathophysiology and the many challenges of
man-machine interface. This study is limited to experi-
ences with checklists and will not discuss the many
additional issues concerned with building a safety
culture.
Acceptance of checklists
Implementing checklists involves many conflicting
interests, including the organisational culture and
workflow, which are often affected [25]. Oversimplifi-
cation of potential challenges could easily lead to con-
flicts between fractions of adopters and opponents.
There are several reports of low compliance when
checklists are introduced in health care [10,26]. Our
data highlights some important assumptions about
achieving checklist acceptance. Firstly, there must be
an identified need or problem for which a checklist is
considered the right solution. A process is doomed to
fail if the safety manager or department head try to
force the “sharp-end” personnel to use a checklist to
solve an issue that is not recognised as a problem. Sec-
ondly, be aware of challenging physicians’ self-esteem
and historically strong cultural autonomy. Human
beings (including physicians) have cognitive limitations
such as difficulty in carefully attending to several
things simultaneously [21]. An effective checklist will
enhance performance during high workload and stress-
ful conditions by freeing mental capacity to perform
important tasks in the correct manner and order [27].
However, checklists should not deprive the operator of
the opportunity to use common sense or indepen-
dently make more reasonable decisions.
Proximity and ownership
The participants in our study emphasized that all stake-
holders must have ownership, not only for the final
checklist but for the entire development process. These
views are consistent with the encouragement to make
local modifications to the WHO Surgical Safety Check-
list [28]. Recent critical reports from the UK call for an
urgent nationwide checklist revision [29,30]. These chal-
lenges regarding checklist acceptance may be the result
Table 4 Communication and understanding during checklist performance.
Context “The end user must be familiar with the background of each point in the checklist” (C)
Terminology and communication “It is important with a predefined and agreed upon phraseology - closed loop communication - “ (F)
“The language must be adapted to the present terminology within the organisation “ (H)
Understanding and situational awareness “The understanding of the text must be unambiguous or clearly defined” (H)
“Be aware of automation, i.e. performing the checklist without being mentally present” (A)
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of failed checklist implementation locally, and lack of
proximity between the checklist-owner and end-users.
Checklist lay-out and design
The visual elements of a checklist are important and will
directly influence its efficacy and feasibility [14]. There
are several guidelines for checklist lay-out and design
from both medicine and aviation [31-33]. All informants
emphasized the importance of short checklists. Long
lists should be divided into shorter sections or separate
lists. One of the informants from aviation (E) described
how they had divided the long “normal procedures
checklist” into three chronological sections; “before take
off”, “in-flight” and “before landing”. The WHO safe
surgery checklist follows the same logic ("check-in”,
“time-out”, and “sign-out”). Checklists must be easy to
find and use, easy to understand, and short.
Simulator training
All but one of the informants had regular and manda-
tory checklist-training in full scale simulators. Such
simulation is an expensive and time consuming training
method, but after decades of experience this is still the
preferred method (gold standard) for team and checklist
training in these HROs. We also believe that team train-
ing is the key for successful checklist implementation in
health care. Local team training with low cost and sim-
ple technical fidelity is a feasible method for rehearsing
complex operations [34]. Success in checklist implemen-
tation is probably more a matter of will, enthusiasm,
and organisational competence than of available time
and financial resources [35].
Flow of expertise and delegation of authority
Health care has traditionally had a strong hierarchical
structure. Such a culture can discourage information
exchange, resulting in anxiety or unwillingness to pro-
vide feedback on a checklist [36]. HROs cultivate a
diversity of expertise; hence, authority migrates to the
personnel with process-specific knowledge, independent
of their hierarchical organisational position [17]. All the
informants described a system where the sharp-ends’
experiences are regarded as a valuable and essential part
of the revision process. Resilience is a key issue in this
context, and has been defined as “the intrinsic ability of
a system to adjust its functioning prior to, during, or
following changes and disturbances.”[37] One corner-
stone of resilience is to understand and obtain experi-
ences from both the sharp and blunt end [38]. A self-
reinforcing and destructive process may develop if a
hierarchical structure prevents feedback from important
stakeholders during checklist implementation.
Checklists reduce prospective memory failures
Prospective memory (PM) describes the ability to
remember to carry out actions (in the near future) that
are planned after a delay or interruption [39]. Unpre-
dictability, delays, and interruptions are frequent in
health care [40]. During a stressful situation, memory is
also likely to be more error-prone [41]. Cognitive aids
like checklists are shown to increase performance in
health care when solving complex and time-critical tasks
[42,43]. All the informants in our study described a cul-
ture where cognitive aids had an essential role. Medicine
has traditionally relied on memory as the basis of diag-
nosis and treatment [42]. It has been argued that “PM
failures in medicine must not be forgotten any more”
[39].
Strengths and limitations
The key strength of this study is the diversity of the
informants, who provided a broad information source.
Despite the nature of their often classified operations,
none of those invited to take part in the study declined
to participate. This enabled insight from an often inac-
cessible safety culture. Additionally, each informant had
10-30 years of cultural experience and an understanding
of their organisations. Still, the informants’ experiences
may not have reflected all the relevant issues regarding
checklist development and implementation from their
own HRO, and the lack of female informants may also
have limited the data to some degree.
Further research
In this study we have obtained experiences from infor-
mants representing six different HROs. It is likely to
Table 5 Methods and approaches for checklist revision and validation
Simulation “Simulation is a good method for validation and testing the usefulness and feasibility of checklists” (C)
“Use simulation to practise checklist utilisation” (E)
“Checklists should be validated regularly according to a plan, in a simulator“ (G)
AE analysis “Use the experience from adverse events during debrief to validate and revise checklists” (E)
Feed-back from end-
users
“The validating and revision group must listen to the end-users’ experiences and frustrations” (D)
“Revision could be done by feedback from the end-user. It is important that the end-users understand that their experiences are
wanted and expected, and that such feed-back may have consequences.” (B)
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believe that these informants, together in an expert con-
sensus process, could have developed and provided
further understanding in checklist implementation.
Checklists in HROs are highly valued and given
resources to develop, use and validate. Critical com-
ments in health care are concerned if checklists may be
cost-ineffective [44]. This line of criticism is debated
claiming that checklists are a cost saving quality
improvement strategy [45]. Studies concerning cost -
benefit should be encouraged.
Conclusion
Checklists are one of the cornerstones of the safety cul-
ture of HROs, and their main purpose is to free work-
ers’ mental capacity to fully attend to operations. Close
cooperation with the “sharp-end” and ownership for all
stakeholders throughout the entire checklist implemen-
tation process are fundamental requirements in HROs.
Despite complex and hazardous operations, HROs man-
age to keep checklists short. Checklists must reflect the
processes they are intended to structure. Simulation is
an essential method for training in reliable communica-
tion, increasing checklist use, and identifying the need
for and implementing revisions.
What is already known on this topic
• The introduction of checklists into health care has
been slow, despite documented effects on morbidity
and mortality.
• HROs often use checklists, and aviation has been
described as the archetype of HROs with extensive
checklist experience.
• Checklists can be viewed as simple tools, but their
implementation is not so simple.
What this study adds
• A recognised and predefined problem is a require-
ment for checklist acceptance.
• The end-users ("sharp end” personnel) are the key
stakeholders throughout the checklist development
process.
• Proximity for all stakeholders throughout the
entire checklist implementation process is
fundamental.
• Even for complex and hazardous operations, HROs
have managed to keep checklists short.
• Simulation is a suitable and necessary part of
checklist testing, implementation, and revision
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